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NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

THE PAN-GERMAN PLOT UNMASKED. By André Chéradame. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.

M. Chéradame's book commands the attention which is due to the work of a faithful and independent investigator, many of whose conclusions have been proved true by the progress of events. The author assiduously studied what he calls the Pan-German plot for twenty-one years, and he studied it not in books or official documents, but through personal observations made in all the countries concerned. So important is it to know the credentials of an author whose book wears in any degree a sensational guise, that it may not be amiss to record the number of towns visited by M. Chéradame in each important country during the course of his researches. These were: in the United States, 14; in Canada, 11; in Japan, 11; in Corea, 4; in Indo China, 19; in British India, 24; in Spain, 1; in Italy, 4; in Belgium, 6; in Luxembourg, 1; in Holland, 5; in Switzerland, 4; in England, 8; in Greece, 2; in Bulgaria, 4; in Roumania, 3; in Serbia, 8; in Turkey, 3; in Germany, 16; in Austro-Hungary, 18. "In these towns," writes the author, "I passed days, weeks, or months, often on repeated occasions. I endeavored, so far as the opportunities admitted of it, to enter into direct relations with the acting ministers, the leaders of the various political parties, the diplomatists and the consuls, both French and foreign, some heads of states, influential journalists, officers of repute, military and naval attachés, well-informed merchants and manufacturers."

It is not surprising that M. Chéradame, an eager student of international politics from his youth up, and a pupil of Albert Sorel, should have derived from these sources a point of view quite different from that of the ordinary French or English official diplomatist. Nor, for various reasons, is it to be wondered at that when, in 1908 or earlier, he began to preach the perils of Pan-Germanism, he was not altogether believed. For years before the outbreak of the war it was generally supposed in England and America that the Pan-Germans were a party of jingoes, generally held in check by the Imperial Government, but allowed to have full swing whenever that Government wished to make a bluff. This view conveniently explained everything. Thus M. Chéradame had difficulty in persuading his hearers that the "Pan-German plot" was anything more than somewhat irresponsible Pan-German propaganda. It seems clear, today, that Japan and Brazil, to say nothing of the United States, are not wrong in supposing that their interests would be seriously endangered by Teutonic success. But entirely apart from any conclusions that may be thought speculative, there are in this book of M. Chéradame's cer-

tain truths of fundamental importance which ought to be widely appreciated, especially in the United States.

In the first place, if you will compare the territorial acquisitions of the Germans in 1916, with the Pan-German "plan of 1911," as outlined in the Pan-German literature of that date, you will find that approximately nine-tenths of the plan had then been carried out. Even if Germany were to resign those limited conquests in the east and west which formed part of the original plan, she would, if she were allowed to retain possession of Austria-Hungary, the conquered Balkan territory, and Turkey, have achieved the whole of that scheme of aggrandizement expressed in the words "Hamburg to the Persian Gulf," *which is the very heart of German policy*. She could then well afford to postpone further aggressions to a later time. With rich resources to draw upon, with an army indefinitely increased, and with only impoverished enemies to confront, she could safely count upon a successful renewal of the effort for world conquest within no long period. It follows that when the leaders of Germany have assured the German people that victory is in sight, they have not been talking wholly for political effect. They have believed what they said; and so long as there is any prospect of a peace based upon the fallacious theory of a "drawn game," they are right in believing it.

In the second place, Austria-Hungary is the crux of the whole problem, and in this connection it is of the highest importance to know that the percentage of real Germans in this composite nation is, even according to German statistics, relatively very small, and that in the interests of German policy this percentage has been enormously exaggerated. The preponderance of Slavs and Czechs within the dual empire is very great. Bohemia is as much oppressed and as desirous of autonomy as Poland has ever been. Even in Hungary it is the Magyar landlords and not the Magyar people who support the Germanized government. Thus, as M. Chéradame forcibly argues, the only just solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem and the only effectual means of curbing Germany would be the creation after the war of "a United States" in what is now Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, to speak of taking measures to counteract the close commercial union of Austria-Hungary with Germany after the conclusion of peace, is to concede by implication fully one-half of the unjust German scheme of domination over non-German peoples, and this is a concession well adapted to drive the non-German races of this exploited nation to despair.

What seems clearest is that the United States, in fighting against Teuton militarism and Teuton barbarity, must realize that she is also fighting against Pan-Germanism. The *Mittel-Europa* scheme was not the dream of visionaries; it was from the German point of view a sound and consistent policy; and it very nearly succeeded. Since German nationalism means Pan-Germanism, and since the races of middle Europe are as distinct and as much entitled to government based upon the consent of the governed as any peoples in the world, this scheme must be smashed, and the bait of "peace without annexations" should be spurned.